

SEPTEMBER 2017

# DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

INVESTING IN PEOPLE,  
PEACE AND PROSPERITY

DISCUSSION PAPER

Development Policy Forum (DPF)



This publication is part of Friends of Europe's Development Policy Forum, which brings together a number of crucial development actors including the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the United Nations and the World Bank to contribute to the global and European conversation on development. In this discussion paper, international experts and practitioners consider how policymakers can address the security-development nexus to build peaceful and inclusive societies. It complements the Friends of Europe Policy Insight debate 'To achieve Agenda 2030, give peace a chance', held as part of the 2017 European Development Days.

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# FOREWORD

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## SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT GO HAND-IN-HAND

Security is not just about strong armies, aircraft carriers and boots-on-the-ground. Peace and stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> century demand that we tackle so-called ‘soft’ or non-traditional security challenges including development, governance, and environmental degradation.

Hard security is the name of the game in many parts of the world. Spending on arms is on the rise worldwide as countries anxiously seek to flex their military muscle.

But some are taking a broader approach and are looking at non-military challenges to peoples and states posed by a host of problems: climate change, cross-border environmental damage and resource depletion, infectious diseases and natural disasters. They are also examining the link between security and irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime.

As the ‘hard’ vs ‘soft’ security debate climbs up the global agenda, let’s listen to recent warnings from European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel that security cannot be “narrowed down” to military spending. Development aid and humanitarian assistance also count as contributions to global security.

Investing in development and in the fight against climate change is not charity. As Federica Mogherini, the EU’s foreign policy chief has pointed out, it is also “an investment, a selfish investment,



in our security”. Long-term stability is the result of strong societies, not strong men.

There is no doubt: security and development are inextricably linked. There can be no sustainable development without peace and security, while development and poverty eradication are crucial to a viable peace. That is why implementing the Sustainable Development Goals is important.

Europe must practice what it preaches. The definition of development aid is becoming wider and more fluid than many like. European aid organisations criticise EU governments over the growing use of foreign aid budgets to meet refugee costs at home. Many EU countries are backsliding on their aid spending commitments.

Security is an important priority for European citizens and will continue to climb higher up the agenda as the world becomes even more volatile, unpredictable and inter-connected. Europe, with its still-large development budget, is well-placed to combine hard and soft power to tackle an array of new and old challenges. It should continue to do so smartly and without apology.

This discussion paper brings together contributions from an array of experts who look at the security and development nexus from different angles and in diverse countries and regions. Their views and experiences in building peaceful and inclusive societies are important, providing valuable lessons on how to strive for peace in a world where war and conflict remain much too often in the headlines.

This publication complements the Friends of Europe Policy Insight debate ‘To achieve Agenda 2030, give peace a chance’, held as part of the 2017 European Development Days.

Happy reading!

**Shada Islam**

Director for Europe and Geopolitics at Friends of Europe

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# PART 1

## THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH



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# Crisis management: moving from **silos** to **networks**



***We have an obligation to take collective action on the conditions on which conflicts feed: feelings of exclusion, humiliation and marginalisation***

**Olivier Ray**, Head of Unit for Crisis Prevention and Post-Conflict Recovery at the Agence Française de Développement (AFD)

**Ariane Joab-Cornu**, Agence Française de Développement (AFD)

Over the past decade, international crises have experienced more violent complications than peaceful resolutions. Confronted with a profound change in the nature of crises, the various stakeholders intervening in fragile societies - diplomats, humanitarians, security actors, development organisations and researchers - must change their methods to create a comprehensive and collective strategy to crisis prevention and conflict resolution.

Armed confrontations have taken on new forms: despite a disturbing revival of power strategies

in recent years, direct war between states has become less frequent. Fuelled by poor development and the subsequent disintegration of social bonds, the crises of recent decades have been marked by a resurgence of civil wars. This mutation is also characterised by three-way crisis dissemination. First, crises pass quickly from local to global. Secondly, 'conflict systems' ignore borders and trap whole regions in cycles of crises. Thirdly, due to the links between political, economic, social and environmental crises, there is a diffusion of one type of crisis to another, leading to prolonged or chronic





crisis situations. One example is Somalia, a country stuck in a fragility trap where crises have been superimposed upon each other for several decades.

The solutions formulated in recent decades are no longer able to solve or stem these crises. If coordinating bodies have multiplied to create synergy between various parallel interventions, operating in different independent silos remains the norm. This fragmentation too often results in a multiplication of specific actions which, despite their relevance, do not create the

transformational effects required for exit from the crisis. Only a comprehensive approach will make it possible to go beyond simply treating the symptoms towards tackling the root cause of a crisis.

In Latin, the term 'krisis' describes the pivotal stage of a disease that can evolve towards healing or death. The approach to a crisis must begin with a diagnosis to identify its structural causes, factors of vulnerability to be reduced and elements of resilience to be reinforced. Like the collegiate body responsible

***Only a comprehensive approach will make it possible to go beyond simply treating the symptoms towards tackling the root cause of a crisis***

for deciding on the most appropriate treatment for eradicating a disease, various stakeholders need to contribute to a joint analysis. Indeed, it is because we observe the world through different prisms that our analyses complement and enrich each other. Our different points of observation make it possible to highlight dimensions that are invisible to other actors.

The same holds true regarding crisis response, where joint analysis between diplomats, humanitarians, security actors, development organisations and researchers is still too rare. Humanitarian and development communities have adopted an approach that is now a quality standard in particularly fragile areas: the principle of ‘do no harm’ (*primum non nocere*), inspired by the Hippocratic oath. It consists of ensuring that external intervention does not risk unwittingly reinforcing the fragility factors at the origin of the crisis. Applied within the framework of a global approach, this principle allows us to avoid the risk of the action of one professional community jeopardising the achievements of another. In this regard, armies are already integrating rehabilitation requirements when targeting strikes, to avoid damaging infrastructure linked to essential services.

Diplomats realise that major announcements at international conferences can lead to unrealistic expectations, thereby increasing populations’ frustration and unintentionally contributing to renewed insecurity. Humanitarian and development actors are aware that poorly-targeted distribution programmes can be captured by armed groups and contribute to their rearmament. This realisation is probably a good start, but analysing the side-effects of remedies must go beyond the principle of ‘no harm’: the new dynamics of crises mean that short-, medium- and long-term actions must be deployed concomitantly and that effects on the political, security, humanitarian and developmental terrains are combined. If we are relatively familiar with the effects of one or another remedy, we can progress with the study of combined effects.

This challenge goes beyond mere crisis management and it must be translated into the field of prevention. Indeed, the cost of inaction in conflict prevention is now known: the cost of a region falling into a chronic crisis where poverty, crime and armed conflict feed each other is exorbitant. There is the cost endured by the populations of the regions concerned, who

are the first to suffer violence and the various forms of food, economic and legal insecurity. The cost for the countries concerned, which see their development prospects questioned and their political systems threatened. The cost to the international community, which will suffer the contagion effects and will, sooner or later, be called to the rescue. We therefore have an obligation to take collective action on the conditions on which conflicts feed: feelings of exclusion, humiliation and marginalisation.

Different groups of actors are already looking into implementing a continuum of actions to achieve common results. But diplomats, humanitarians, security actors, development organisations and researchers too often operate according to their own references. Joint analyses, seminars on the sharing and mapping of interventions and a common vision of 'no harm' are all elements that would allow these different communities to help vulnerable populations benefit from the lasting effects of their actions. ●





## Colombia: lessons on security, development and peace



***The combination and consistency of security and development measures can reverse the cycles of violence***

**María Victoria Llorente**, Executive Director of the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), Colombia

**Sergio Guarín**, Director of the Postconflict and Peacebuilding Programme at the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), Colombia

Colombia is a 21<sup>st</sup> century miracle. In less than twenty years our country has gone from failed state to beginning its accession process to the OECD. In that period our homicide rate per 100,000 people was reduced from 66 to 24, while multidimensional poverty fell from 30.4% to 17.8% and unemployment decreased from 16.9% to 9.7%. Today it serves as a laboratory for public policies on the nexus between security, development and peace.

Throughout this transition the Colombian authorities have had to deal with considerable

security challenges. The internal armed conflict between the state, the FARC guerrilla movement and extreme right-wing paramilitaries claimed more than eight million direct victims over the last thirty years. Organised crime is also a problem: Colombia continues to be the world's main cocaine producer, and the criminal exploitation of gold has had devastating environmental effects, in addition to its humanitarian impacts. The FARC was an active force in a quarter of Colombia's municipalities, and its departure has led to the reconfiguration of guerrilla strongholds and criminal organisations. These groups are





the driving forces behind illicit economies in many regions, a situation which is both a cause and a consequence of the state weakness at the local level and which represents a huge challenge to territorial peace.

Meanwhile, significant development challenges include a lack of universal education and healthcare provision, highly unequal wealth distribution and deficient infrastructure. These features are aggravated in rural areas where unresolved issues related to land tenure, distribution and use have been a source of violence and ongoing social tensions. Added to this is the country's excessive dependence on the export of basic goods and income from the mining and energy sectors for state financing.

Tackling security and development issues has proved very difficult in territories dominated by armed conflict and criminal activities. However, recent governments have acknowledged the inextricable link between the two areas. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the

state emphasised security measures, seeing security as the necessary condition for investor confidence from which development would flow naturally. According to this view, the state's responsibility is primarily to foster a threat-free scenario, eradicating insurgency, and encouraging private capital to find new business opportunities in traditionally excluded areas.

As a result, Colombia improved and modernised its police and armed forces. It strengthened its intelligence services and its ability to carry out joint military operations, enhanced its air weapons and, after great military and police efforts, cornered the guerrillas. In parallel, it contained the production and trafficking of narcotics and managed to partially dismantle the paramilitary groups, gaining control of many territories that had been under the influence of illegal armed groups.

But for the regions most in need neither the improvement in security conditions nor the incentives for capital investments were able

## COLOMBIA PEACE DEAL

In late 2016 the Colombian government signed a peace deal with the Marxist rebel group, FARC. The deal put an end to a 50-year conflict that erupted largely as a result of widespread poverty and inequality in rural areas, following years of repression and civil war. Despite the deal being rejected in a referendum last year, it was approved by lawmakers and has managed to hold. It covers rural reform, political participation, disarmament, drug trafficking and victim redress.

to unleash virtuous circuits of development and peace. In fact, in many of these regions conflict, protest and social unrest have become more acute.

From our point of view, a fundamental part of the success of post-conflict reconstruction lies in the capacity to design and implement comprehensive policies that effectively combine efforts to ensure safe environments with measures to generate decent and productive living conditions. It is in this intersection between security and development that the heart of peace lies.

One case is that of illicit crops, a problem exacerbated by the existence of vast areas of Colombian territory far from the public goods

and services provided by the State and with very few possibilities of effective insertion into legal markets. In recent years, national and international alarms have been ignited by a significant increase in Colombia's cultivated area of coca up to 146,000 hectares, similar to levels of fifteen years ago.

Among the reasons for this boom are the international fall in gold prices and the simultaneous rise in the price of the dollar, which once again tilted the balance of illegal markets to the cocaine business. It also reflects the ability of coca growers to adapt to the state's eradication strategies and their expectations of receiving benefits from the crop substitution programmes provided for in the FARC agreements.



***There is an ongoing necessity for a development model that provides opportunities for those who have historically been excluded***

The illicit crop problem is a clear example of how an exclusively security-based approach, while indispensable for generating behavioural incentives, has a very limited transformational capacity in the medium term. For years Colombia has invested enormous efforts and resources in the aerial spraying of more than one-and-a-half million hectares and in the criminalisation of cultivators and gatherers. This has not led to a substantial change and, on the contrary, has taken an enormous toll on the legitimacy of the state.

Likewise, socio-economic development programmes that are detached from security strategies have yielded very poor results. A programme of direct subsidies to coca farmers ignored the fact that the criminal actors who dominate the cocaine chain exert their influence through extortion, corruption and violence, and without a consistent security strategy to accompany development measures the effective transformation of territorial conditions will be nothing more than an illusion.

It is the combination and consistency of security and development measures that can reverse

the cycles of violence: the fundamental question that remains is how these measures should be sequenced. One case that could provide an answer is the Comprehensive Consolidation Plan of the Macarena, a serrania (mountainous area) located in the south of Colombia that was a FARC sanctuary with high levels of coca production. Here, between 2007 and 2008, the Colombian state designed an approach that began with the military takeover, was followed by the establishment of police and judicial order, and ended with social action by the state.

This plan, which also had a permanent component of citizen participation to accompany decision-making, reduced illicit crops, strengthened the legitimacy of the state and began a process of territorial transformation. Unfortunately this effort, which was replicated without success in more than ten regions of the country, did not receive continuous support from the authorities, demonstrating that the coordination of security and development policies requires leadership with a long-term strategic vision.

Today, Colombia is going through a crucial moment. After signing the agreement to end the conflict with the FARC, security threats are being reconfigured in regions undergoing post-conflict transition.

Meanwhile, there is an ongoing necessity for a development model with a territorial approach that provides opportunities for those who have historically been excluded. The sustainability of our desired peace will depend upon the state's success in achieving this integrated action. ●



# Peace is the **ultimate goal** of conflict – and cooperation is the key



***Crises grab our attention, motivate us to action, and force us to collaborate and cooperate***

**Michael C. Ryan**, Former Director at the Interagency Partnering Directorate of the US European Command (USEUCOM)

It's time we think about peace. By doing so in the context of war, we might win both the war and the peace.

We plan to win wars and therefore we organise, train and equip ourselves, our allies and our partners to win wars. But what is our plan to win the peace? How do we train for that? Do we even really understand the new complexities of the globally-integrated 21<sup>st</sup> century?

War is the ultimate come-as-you-are event: it doesn't allow time to prepare. Military victory must be pursued before a war begins; but military victory is no longer a sufficient outcome.

Lasting peace is the ultimate goal, but it cannot be achieved without preparation, which must be pursued even before a war begins.

The United States-led military missions accomplished in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, were only the beginning of the fight for the real victory - peace. The massive application of treasure that followed the military's exploits does not appear to have been as well planned as the military campaign that preceded. It begs the questions: did we really understand the nature of the war we were about to enter into before we engaged in combat? Do we ever?



Over the last fourteen years of war, a few simple truths have emerged.

First, **cost**: we cannot afford our current way of dealing with instability, and we never could. Nevertheless, we become involved again and again. It will be too expensive unless we adapt.

Second, **collateral damage**: any time we choose 'kinetic options' - formerly known as violence - we create a humanitarian disaster on some scale. We are not prepared in advance to deal with those consequences.

Third, **collaboration**: many people are constantly engaged in improving the human condition,

wherever the military goes. These people don't work for defence ministries or for government. So military personnel don't know who these people are or how to work with them, and their work is often neglected in operational planning. But these people are addressing instability on the ground before the military arrives; many stay during the military operations; most return to continue their work after the conflict is over.

Fourth, **cooperation**: the armed forces are not the solution - they are part of the solution, but we have yet to figure out how to effectively integrate military and civilian activities. Creating the conditions for the success of others is the key activity of the military.

And last but not least, **context**: preparing the exit strategy for the next possible conflict now is the best guarantor of future success. Understanding the context in which we are operating, committing to close cooperation with those also engaged, and collaborating effectively with partners to ‘de-conflict’, coordinate and integrate everyone’s efforts, are essential elements of the military’s realisation of a tenable exit strategy.

With a good plan in hand, the military must be prepared to operate on the ground in the area of instability in ways that reinforce the stability and the development work of the international community. But such comprehensive preparation to win the peace and to understand the exit strategy takes time, and as time is scarce once a military operation begins, the preparation must take place in advance.

It’s always been easier to form a coalition to manage a crisis than to create a coalition to prevent one. But the silver lining is this: if we can build the necessary relationships to operate effectively together from day one of a crisis, we would have the same set of relationships and the same level of understanding required to work collectively to prevent that same crisis in the first place.

Even if we don’t fully prevent conflict from breaking out, our collective efforts from the start can go a long way towards mitigating the consequences of the conflict, reducing its intensity and shortening its duration.

By focusing our collaborative efforts on building a coherent capacity to manage the next crisis

## ***War is the ultimate come-as-you-are event: it doesn’t allow time to prepare***

somewhere in the world, we will simultaneously develop the capacity to work together effectively in potentially unstable hot spots while there is still time to do something about it.

Crises grab our attention, motivate us to action, and force us to collaborate and cooperate. It’s time to take the energy we put into responding individually and then figuring out how to work together on the ground, and channel it into preparing together to respond collectively. In this way, thinking about both war and peace in the same context, we see how preparing for war with a view toward the peace that follows can give us the capability to better preserve the peace in the first place. An ounce of prevention is certainly a pound of cure in this case.

And this is an urgent imperative. If we continue to see crisis response as too expensive and too ineffective, we will not respond. If we continue to see conflict prevention as too complicated and too amorphous, we will not apply the resources we need in time.

Only by living the way we intend to fight, doing the difficult now so the easy will come, can we start to develop the collective set of skills we need to engage effectively - if we are to win the peace we must start now. ●

# Engineering

## the security-development nexus, the Japanese way



***Engineering is one of the most critical elements of peace operations, especially at the mission start-up phase and in challenging environments***

**Atsushi Hanatani**, PhD, Advisor to the Director-General of the Infrastructure and Peacebuilding Department at the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Reconstructing state institutions to win lasting peace in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (known as FCAS) requires multiple efforts involving both civilian (humanitarian and development) and military actors. It is widely recognised that there is no development without peace, and there is no peace without development. So there is an urgent need to strengthen the security-development nexus.

The international community has endeavoured to frame this all-inclusive approach under different names and concepts, including ‘CIMIC’ (civil military cooperation), a ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA), a ‘comprehensive approach’

or ‘3D’ (defence, diplomacy and development), to name but a few. Japan is no exception to this international drive to strengthen the security-development nexus; but it approaches the subject from a different angle, reflecting its own unique history and policy environment.

In terms of its security policy, since the end of the Second World War Japan has maintained a rather restrictive position focused on its own self-defence under Article 9 of the Constitution. In response to the country’s historical experience, Japanese policymakers and the general public have shared a strong sense of pacifism and abhorrence of the use of military





power. But in 1992 Japan decided to play a more proactive role in working towards stability in the international community by enacting the International Peace Cooperation Act. Since then, under this law, Japan has actively engaged in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) activities through the dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF) to Asia (Cambodia, East Timor, Nepal), the Middle East (Golan Heights), the Caribbean (Haiti) and Africa (Mozambique, South Sudan).

More recently, Japan's National Security Strategy of 2013 has made it clear that it wishes to play an even more proactive role as a major global

player in the international community under the policy of "proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation". Under this strategy, Japan is willing to "further step up its cooperation with UN PKO and other international peace cooperation activities even more proactively". Furthermore, the strategy refers for the first time to the need to strengthen civil-military cooperation by stating that, when participating in PKO, Japan will "endeavour to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects".

***Japan has been one of the major contributors to South Sudan's state-building efforts since before independence***

This mention of the need for civil-military cooperation is echoed in ODA policy. The recently-revised International Cooperation Charter of 2015 advocates strengthening coordination between the ODA and PKO (including the participating JSDF unit) to ensure effective resource use.

Collaborative exercises between the JSDF and ODA programmes are often called All-Japan Cooperation (meaning cooperation among Japanese key actors at government level as its core value). One of the most notable examples of such a collaborative effort between JSDF attached to PKO and ODA has been observed in Japan's contribution of the 350-strong JSDF Engineering Unit to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), since 2012. This was made possible by the fact that the original, pre-December 2013 UNMISS mandate included consolidation of peace through long-term state-building and economic development, and through the strong commitment of the Japanese government to support this new-born nation.

Japan has been one of the major contributors to South Sudan's state-building efforts

since before independence, through the implementation of developmental programmes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). During the relatively peaceful period between 2011 and 2013, many collaborative activities were undertaken between the JSDF Engineering Unit and Japanese ODA programmes (including NGOs and UN agencies that benefitted from Japanese funding), mainly in the field of infrastructure development (including road repair and rehabilitation, and warehouse construction). Similar exercises have been undertaken in East Timor, Iraq and Haiti.

What are the key features of this All-Japan Cooperation, the Japanese version of civil-military cooperation?

First, as a precondition, Japan does not engage directly in stabilisation activities, but focuses on engineering activities. This is because the International Peace Cooperation Act of Japan demands strict compliance with Article 9 of the Constitution, and JSDF participation in peacekeeping operations is approved only when agreement on a ceasefire has been reached and maintained among conflicting

parties, and when the use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary to protect its own personnel.

Second, civil-military cooperation is led not by military actors but by civilian actors like JICA and MOFA, who implement ODA programmes. In most collaborative exercises that have taken place, it has been widespread practice for JSDF to provide complementary support to the ODA programmes implemented by civilian actors, not vice versa.

Third, civil-military cooperation has taken place mainly around development-related activities, leaving aside the security and political aspects of peacebuilding. This is not to say

that engineering activities are not important; instead, engineering is considered to be one of the most critical elements of peace operations, especially at the mission start-up phase and in challenging environments like South Sudan.

While the scope of civil-military cooperation among Japanese actors is still limited and engineering-focused, it nonetheless has the potential to make a unique contribution to international peacebuilding efforts by providing infrastructural assets and services. Under its current policy of proactive contribution to peace, Japan is expected to expand and deepen its efforts in this field to further strengthen the security-development nexus. ●





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## PART 2

# GETTING PRIORITIES RIGHT



JOINTLY TACKLING GLOBAL CHALLENGES:  
THE PEACE-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN GERMANY AND THE EU

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MILITARISATION SHOULD NOT TRUMP DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA IN BATTLE FOR EU FUNDS

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# Jointly tackling **global challenges:** the peace-development nexus in Germany and the EU



*It is often possible to break the conflict cycle  
by stepping in early enough to address the root causes*

**Franziska Brantner**, Chair of the permanent Subcommittee for Civilian Crisis Prevention in the German Bundestag; Trustee of Friends of Europe; European Young Leader

Around two billion people worldwide suffer from malnutrition. More than 800 million face starvation. It is well-known that this is not due to the lack of food in general, but rather the uneven distribution of food. But how did the uneven distribution come about? What are the obstacles to fair distribution?

Armed conflict is one major impediment. It does not allow space for just development that benefits all members of society. Likewise, without development and social justice, there is no stable, sustainable peace. For both peace and development, prevention is key.

The United Nations has agreed on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that target poverty eradication by tackling all contributing factors, including climate change, armed conflict, access to justice and inclusion of all political stakeholders. It is often possible to break the conflict cycle by stepping in early enough to address the root causes. But frequently, despite warning signs, preventative measures are taken much too late.

The first paragraph of the German constitution stresses that Germany must strive for peace worldwide, and the connection between peace





and development plays a prominent role in debates in the German parliament. I serve as Chair of a permanent Subcommittee for Civilian Crisis Prevention, which is a connecting point for all relevant government ministries and MPs from various committees who work on these issues. All stakeholders are invited to speak about even uncomfortable issues where foreign policy and development may have opposing goals. This platform leads to interaction between different sectors, providing an invaluable tool to enhance communication and cooperation and reach joint policy decisions that address problems in their full complexity.

But we need a similar forum at the executive level that ensures that all German government policies and decisions – whether on foreign affairs, development, economics, finance, climate, trade or migration – contribute to global peace. That is why the Greens propose to create a National Council for Peace and Sustainability.

In addition, we support putting the focus of German crisis prevention policy on four dimensions. First, the expansion and promotion of mediation measures to settle conflicts as early as possible. Second, the support of rule of law for peaceful unity based on reliable rules. Third, security sector reform to enforce those rules in a fair and transparent way. And fourth, truth and justice, as well as reconciliation, to heal the pain and prevent future repetition.

One key to sustainable and peaceful development is the inclusion of women, who are frequently excluded from peace talks

and peace-building measures even though women and girls are often unequally affected by armed conflicts (for instance, through rape). UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the inclusion of women in peace and security should finally be implemented in German foreign policy – not just on paper, but also in practice.

The UN is the most important platform for international coordination and it is making a remarkable effort. But the Security Council is often blocked and the General Assembly cannot agree on measures. This is where regional actors can join forces and bridge the gap.

The European Union is an incredible peace project that aims to support peaceful development around the world. However, current proposals put forward by both the European Commission and the External Action Service (EEAS) aim to divert funds from existing civilian conflict prevention and development instruments and budget-lines towards military capacity-building programmes for armed forces in fragile countries.

While support for such actors may be important under some circumstances, they should be funded by appropriate foreign and security funds. This step shows that under the umbrella of the security-development nexus, risky and misguided concepts are currently being promoted. Civilian conflict prevention (known in EU circles as IcSP – the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace) and development funds are already extensively used for supporting migration control instruments, and I believe it is a strategic mistake to also divert money



from these funds for military ends. While there is an increase of armed conflict in developing countries, we should not conclude that development aid now needs to be spent on security measures.

As stated by the Greens in the European Parliament last year, it would make more sense to better link long-term development programmes to short- and medium-term peace-building and conflict prevention measures. Often there is no proper follow-up of the latter and positive developments are not maintained. Instead of diverting funds to military security, a promising approach would be to boost investment in budgets, staff and other resources for transitional justice, demobilisation, re-integration of former combatants, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation efforts.

EU member states should also jointly tackle security sector reform in fragile countries. People will only regain trust in local police and armed forces if they are effective, transparent, free of corruption and accountable to both citizens and parliaments. It is very important that development policies build on these preventive approaches and make positive short-term developments sustainable.

Finally, we need a comprehensive approach – nationally, at the EU level and globally – to security and development. This would ideally encompass a very restrictive export policy on harmful technology, be it cyber-surveillance technology or conventional weapons. Criterion 8 of the EU Common Position on arms exports rightly demands that EU member states assess

## ***One key to sustainable and peaceful development is the inclusion of women***

whether the proposed arms export “would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country”. As we all know, this criterion is not implemented. Just as we try to promote coherence at the national level, we need it at the European level too.

It is especially important that all states join forces and tackle the challenges jointly while giving the benefit of their different expertise, resources and geographic advantages. We need to share responsibility: no one single country can maintain focus on all countries that deserve attention. The EU could be wonderfully placed to respond to this challenge: the EEAS could combine efforts with member states that pledge support and monetary aid to a given country for a decade. In this way, we could enhance our long-term impact for peace and development.

Global justice, peace and development go hand in hand. Let's walk together on all levels of the democratic decision-making process: within parties, across communities, beyond regional and state borders. And let's overcome short-sighted quarrels that have hindered civilian conflict prevention measures. ●

# Consequences of the development-security nexus in post-2001 Afghanistan



***The grave challenges and uncertainties facing Afghans today are a direct consequence of the prioritisation of military over development objectives***

**Mariam Safi**, Founder and Executive Director of the Organisation for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), Afghanistan

We often hear Afghans lament the misspending of development aid in Afghanistan: “So much money came during Karzai’s early years - some was spent on small projects, but what happened to the rest? If this money was used properly all of Afghanistan would have been fixed by now.”

The Asia Foundation’s annual Survey of the Afghan People showed that in 2016 only 29.3% of Afghans felt the country was moving in the right direction, the lowest level of optimism recorded since the survey started in 2004.

Why, after 16 years of development efforts under the largest peace-building mission in the history of the United Nations, are Afghans voicing feelings of uncertainty, hopelessness and extreme cynicism about their future and that of their country?

According to the Asian Development Bank 39.1% of the population lives below the national poverty line, higher than any other country in central and west Asia. This is a dramatic increase from the recorded 36% in 2011-2012. Unemployment has also increased,



jumping from 25% in 2015 to an astounding 40% in 2016. Youth unemployment in particular accounts for 46% of the total unemployed population. Annually an estimated 400,000 young people try to enter the labour market, but with no economic opportunities they either become labour migrants, pay traffickers to take them to Europe (causing a massive brain drain), or work in precarious jobs.

Afghanistan continues to be ranked the third most corrupt country by Transparency International. Health indicators also remain

below the average for low income countries, and the agriculture sector - the second largest contributor to the GDP - faces challenges due to shrinking cultivatable land, insecurity, poor market conditions, lack of technical support, farmers' displacement and cheap food imports from neighbouring countries. Moreover, insecurity fuelled by insurgency-related attacks has also risen drastically causing districts, and at times entire provinces, to fall under Taliban control, with an alarming escalation in civilian casualties.





Why, despite receiving more than US\$100bn in aid since 2001, are the challenges confronting Afghanistan far surpassing its achievements? The answer to this lies in the reconstruction framework adopted for Afghanistan back in 2001 where the assumption that peace and stability could only be achieved with a military victory was promoted by external actors. The international community's belief that a military victory was a prerequisite for creating the environment needed to initiate development efforts was the flaw in thinking that has led to many of Afghanistan's present day crises.

International engagement in Afghanistan has been gravely undermined by uncertainty not only over the extent of the military presence but also its intent: war, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building or peace-building? Repeatedly since 2001, under the umbrella of state-building, the international community prioritised security above development and

used the latter as an instrument of stabilisation within a strictly security-oriented framework.

What has ensued has been an integration of civilian-military agencies, where civilian assistance became inextricably linked with and guided by political and military objectives. This saw the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) use development and reconstruction activities to undermine the Taliban and enhance the legitimacy of the Afghan government. This approach has not only been deeply counter-productive, it also hindered aid agency operations. The clearest example is that of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that the international community created as an instrument of stabilisation in the country.

In 2001, American troops swiftly removed the Taliban, leaving leaders scrambling for cover and even agreeing to lay down arms and reintegrate into their communities. This was

an opportunity to reconcile warring parties and proceed with a rigorous development agenda that would address local grievances, build governance and reduce poverty. Instead, the United States blindly pursued its 'War on Terror', focusing efforts on counter-terrorism under the rhetoric of state-building overseen by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). From 2001 to 2008, aid expenditure was less than ten per cent of what had been spent in post-war Bosnia and less than a quarter of that given to post-conflict East Timor. Most donor funding was channelled to support military activities instead of development programmes, and this was done through PRTs.

The first PRTs were created in 2003 and were US-led; responsibility was later transferred to different NATO contributing countries. PRTs were supposed to have significant civilian leadership but instead were comprised mostly of military personnel. So instead of addressing local grievances with long-term development planning, they were tasked with 'quick impact projects' (QIPs) that focused on the counter-insurgency doctrine of 'winning hearts and minds.' The absence of skills for development and the requisite planning and promotion of local ownership made QIPs unsustainable.

The structure, activities, funding and size of PRTs also varied across NATO partners, and the lack of coordination between them and also with aid agencies resulted in a lack of standard operating procedures, and no clear definition of what their activities should entail. For example, in 2006 the Lithuanian PRT in Ghor province spent approximately \$462,000

on development projects while the Italian PRT in neighbouring Herat province spent \$4.5m. In many instances the support PRTs intended for building governance translated into promoting the authority of local warlords and militia commanders.

Both the western humanitarian community and the Afghan government have raised criticisms of PRT operations. By 2011 former president Hamid Karzai had become extremely sceptical of PRT objectives and called for their closure upon the transfer of military responsibilities from US-led NATO forces to Afghan authorities by 2014. He argued they would not be needed: the Afghan state would take over military and reconstruction projects as per the 'Afghan-led and Afghan-owned' strategy.

In the Afghan context, PRTs have led to the intensification of the conflict, the establishment of bad governance, and inadequate short-term development projects.

Lodged within the broader stabilisation framework, the PRTs' aim to militarise and politicise assistance by aligning aid with stabilisation objectives rather than addressing the needs of locals have widened the gap between the state and its citizens. It has created pools of young men vulnerable to insurgency recruitment, fuelled the narcotics industry, and prevented the creation of a strong legal economy. The grave challenges and uncertainties facing Afghans today are a direct consequence of the prioritisation of military over development objectives and serve as a strong lesson for future international interventions. ●



## **Militarisation** should not trump development criteria in battle for **EU funds**



***Currently the European Union hosts a mere six percent of the world's displaced people***

**Heidi Hautala**, Member of the European Parliament and former Minister for International Development and State Ownership Steering of Finland (2011-2013)

It is widely accepted that development and security are interlinked. There is a close connection between poverty and conflict; for example, studies show that poverty makes countries more prone to civil war. Unfortunately the coexistence of these two conditions will become more widespread in the future. It is estimated that by 2030, almost half of those living in extreme poverty will be in countries with a high risk of violence. Climate change will exacerbate the vicious circle of poverty and conflict, especially in the most fragile countries and regions. The poor and marginalised are always the hardest hit, driven from their homes

and deprived of services and opportunities such as healthcare and education.

The importance of conflict prevention, peace mediation and peacebuilding to alleviate these situations is undeniable. But investment in strengthening democracy and building accountable institutions is also crucial in supporting vulnerable societies. The prevention of conflict and violence must be key, using both security and development measures as appropriate.

One issue that would benefit from a more comprehensive European strategy on the



intersection of security and development is that of internal displacement. It receives little attention but right now forced displacement is one of the biggest crises in developing countries. For every refugee there are now two internally displaced people (IDPs), but financial support for the resettlement of refugees in donor countries is greater than that given to countries dealing with IDPs. Forty million people are internally displaced due to conflict, and an additional 24 million because of natural disasters. Currently, the European Union hosts a mere six percent of the world's displaced people.

The aggravated displacement figures have not appeared overnight, but the EU reacted only once refugees started crossing Europe's own borders in great numbers. Moreover, this reaction has hardly been responsible or sustainable, focussing on protecting the short-term security interests of its member states rather than resolving the situation's underlying causes. The EU has done its best to close its borders by striking a deal with Turkey, but also diverting development funds aimed at poverty reduction towards security-related expenditure. A growing trend has been the conditionality of Official Development Assistance on returns,

***It receives little attention but right now forced displacement is one of the biggest crises in developing countries***

readmissions and border control. This is an alarming change that leads us to question the EU's willingness to address the root causes of global poverty and conflict.

Recently the European Parliament's role in safeguarding the proper and lawful use of EU development funds has become more important than ever, as member states and the External Action Service (EEAS) have shifted their focus towards combatting migration and supporting military capacity-building. It is regrettable that this interpretation of the security and development nexus has started to ignore the comprehensive notion of human security.

A concrete example of the efforts to divert development funds to security-related costs is the proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The European Commission tabled this proposal in July 2016, following a request by ten member states, with the aim of contributing to capacity-building for security and development in third countries. If passed, the amended instrument could open the way to use development funds to support the activities of armed forces in third countries. The legal basis of this amendment was disputed from the outset, even by the institutions' own legal services.

There is a case for creating a dedicated instrument with corresponding financing, as was done for the African Peace Facility. Instead the Commission proposed that funds be diverted from an already under-resourced development budget that should be spent on alleviating poverty and its underlying causes. The argument given for this process is the urgency of the need for capacity-building.

The proposal highlights conflicting approaches within the EU itself. The European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs wants to reformulate the instrument almost exclusively for military capacity-building in third countries. On the other hand, the Committee on Development rightly emphasises poverty eradication and adherence to the official development assistance criteria. Well aware of the proposal's shortcomings, the Council suggested strengthening the development aspect by defining its aim as "capacity-building in support of development and security for development in third countries". It seems the EU institutions' different stances are close to irreconcilable.

EU actions on the nexus of security and development at present are not based on a cool analysis of the issues and therefore the strategy simply does not work. While there is a case for a dedicated instrument for military capacity-building in third countries with a correct legal basis and appropriate funding, we should address the reasons for global poverty, internal displacement and the situation of refugees by improving our development policies and strengthening instruments. ●

# The role of public finance in securing development



*Domestic revenues are at the heart of financing and reform in security*

**Bernard Harborne**, Lead Specialist on Peace, Conflict and Violence at the World Bank

In my first-ever trial as a twenty-something prosecutor, I confronted the question of the use of force by a security actor. In this case, it was a lowly ‘drunk and disorderly’ trial. When, during cross-examination, a policeman admitted he had raised a fist unprovoked against the (aged) accused, I conferred with the judge and dropped the case.

Questions about the role of security institutions using force in a range of contexts constantly play on our minds: the killing of a citizen by a policeman in unclear circumstances; the launch of missiles or drone attacks on foreign territories as punishment or part of ‘counter-terrorism’ measures. Or we experience the direct effects

of localised conflicts, with insurgents causing displacement and egregious hardship.

The ‘security-development nexus’ has been present in policy discourse for more than two decades to help us contend with two challenges: first, how to improve security ‘outcomes’ for citizens; and second, how to reform security as an ‘instrument’, so that it performs a service in our interest as citizens that is professional, accountable, and effective.

But policy discourse has translated into mixed progress on the ground. There are few evidence-based examples of success in the reform of security institutions. Where security reform has

been part of an endogenous political process of transformation then changes are palpable. Democratisation and demilitarisation in Latin America and the transitions in eastern Europe are good examples. Yet as the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict Security and Development reminded us, military transformations (for example, withdrawal from the political arena) take time; 17 years in the quickest cases (Portugal and South Korea).

What has been more challenging is for security sector reform (SSR) as a 'development project' to achieve the kinds of gains that can be achieved in other sectors (as indicated, for example, by the Sustainable Development Goals). Many of the prominent international interventions in war-to-peace transitions, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and Somalia, have security sector reform as key components. But so far there have been few signs that militaries and police forces are being transformed into capable and accountable security service providers, not only for the state but for citizens.

The link between public finance and the security sector has been largely missing from this growing body of policy and practice. While general aspirations for affordability are often stressed regarding SSR, there has been little guidance to support governments in better understanding whether security sector costs are contained within a sustainable macrofiscal envelope, let alone efficiently and effectively allocated. After all, domestic revenues are the largest source of funding for security and justice institutions. To coin a phrase from the work on financing development: "a country's ability to

mobilize domestic resources and spend them effectively... lies at the crux of financing for development." These are also at the heart of financing and reform in security.

To fill this gap, a ground-breaking piece of work has come to fruition after a three-year partnership between the World Bank and the United Nations. The product is the publication 'Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector'. This is a sourcebook providing guidance to governments and practitioners on how to assess public expenditures, to produce the necessary data and analysis to inform decisions around security policy.

The sourcebook builds on a public finance assessment tool, the public expenditure review, which is a tried-and-tested modality for assessing government sector budgets, for example in health or education. This has now been adapted for use in the security and criminal justice sectors. The partnership has been of value in combining the World Bank's technical strengths in economics, public finance, institutions and governance with the UN's experience in security, peacekeeping operations and the rule of law.

The partnership has provided rigour to the policy dialogue in the form of data and analysis of the critical challenges facing governments. In war-to-peace transitions, for example, countries face key trade-offs between integrating armed groups into a national force and the fiscal constraints of paying an army. In countries such as Liberia and Somalia, governments have been able to start weighing options on the size of their respective



armies, options for right-sizing, including costs for demobilisation and pensions, as well as costs related to increasing police numbers.

In other settings, these tools have been used to provide recommendations on areas in which governments can tighten management and budget controls and obtain greater efficiencies (for example, in the Central African Republic, Mexico, Mali and the Philippines). Above all, it has allowed for a better integration of security institutions, more often than not treated exceptionally, into the government budgeting process. Reform of public financial management in security is a way, albeit an incremental one, to strengthen civilian oversight, accountability and transparency.

In turn, this has potential to improve the way in which external actors finance security institutions

in developing countries. According to the OECD, “aid to the security sector comprises a small amount of all sector-allocated aid” (some 1.4% for security and 3.1% for related justice). In 2012, aid allocated to building the security sector in fragile states totalled only US\$858m. These figures do not include direct military assistance, which runs into several billions of dollars (and which, as yet, is not globally measured). This aid does not usually follow the principles of ‘aid effectiveness’ and is often provided unilaterally, without scrutiny, consultation or coordination.

Governments still play the primary role in security provision, but bringing in the public finance perspective is beginning to show promising dividends as they face the policy and operational challenges of modernising security services and making them more legitimate and effective. ●





## JICA's Initiatives


# A Bridge Linking Japan with Developing Countries

JICA assists and supports developing countries as the executing agency of Japanese ODA. In accordance with its vision of "Inclusive and Dynamic Development," JICA supports the resolution of issues of developing countries by using the most suitable tools of various assistance methods and a combined regional-, country- and issue-oriented approach.

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## PART 3

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# Security and development in the **Sahel Sahara**



***In many countries, a lack of security is primarily the product of ineffective or irresponsible governance***

**Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah**, President of the Centre for Strategy and Security in the Sahel Sahara, Mauritania

Fifty years ago, Felix Houphouet Boigny, President of Côte d'Ivoire, used to remind his fellow citizens that “there is no development without peace”, adding that “while economic injustice can be corrected at a later stage, violence and anarchy are too costly to be repaired in a life time”.

Houphouet Boigny's acknowledgement of the link between security and development came after the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, in a Europe devastated by the Second World War, had already begun to address this complex nexus. Today, the United Nations 2030 Agenda

for Sustainable Development, the European Union's Global Strategy and the EU Consensus on Development continue to debate it.

The question was, and still is: how can we build peaceful and inclusive societies in fragile states?

A peaceful world needs to provide security for countries and their populations by combating extreme poverty, protecting social and physical infrastructures and therefore removing the grounds for civil conflicts that are the ultimate insecurity.



Both insecurity and conflicts are lethal threats to development: it is the poor who suffer most from resource scarcity and environmental degradation resulting from armed conflicts. It is the same poor who also are most affected by the lack of development.

Non-dogmatic approaches need to be devised to confront the reality of today's security threats, especially in light of the continued conflicts plaguing a large number of countries, particularly Libya and the states of the Sahel Sahara and the Horn of Africa.

One recurrent question enters the discussion: is the security discussed that of the state or of its citizens? Simultaneously addressing the security of both is a significant yet necessary challenge.

Focusing primarily on a government's security – in other words, the survival of the regime – does not necessarily ensure security for individuals. In many countries, a lack of security is primarily the product of ineffective or irresponsible governance. Equally, outdated and misguided governance practices cannot provide successful development strategies.



Pervasive corruption and domestic policies that discriminate based on ethnicity, religious or geographical origins are as lethal as armed conflicts. Indeed, they fuel them. Moreover, these policies discredit the governments, and so further undermine their effectiveness in fighting for development and security.

Since the 1990s armed violence in Africa has taken place in the form of violent civil wars (in Burundi, Rwanda, Congo/Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda), often with little

or no external interference. These rebellions were often uprisings against social exclusion or mismanagement carried out by oppressive and corrupt regimes. Their peaceful settlement generally resulted from better governance strategies, including power-sharing.

Today, in a fast-changing environment, many political leaders continue to manage their countries primarily on a tribal or regional basis. Blinded by greed, or prisoners of tribal clans and groups, they often ignore and dismiss today's

## EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY: A GLOSSARY

**Sustainable Development Goals:** 17 UN-agreed goals to help end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all by 2030, including Goal 16 for 'peaceful and inclusive societies'.

**Global strategy:** the EU's over-arching foreign policy and security strategy, agreed in 2016, which includes an 'integrated approach to conflicts' as one of its five priorities. A **communication on 'resilience'** (June 2017) set out how to move from crisis containment to prevention.

**European consensus on development:** A June 2017 agreement signed by all three EU institutions and 28 member states, to help meet the SDGs. Its primary aim is poverty eradication, but it links development to other policies, including peace, security, migration and climate change.

**European Development Fund (EDF):** The EU's main fund for development aid, worth €30.5bn in 2014-20. It sits outside the EU budget, and is financed directly by EU countries.

**European external investment plan:** An €88bn fund for Africa and the EU neighbourhood, set up in 2016 to tackle the root causes of migration.

***The chief difficulty to be addressed is how governments can place the concerns of their citizens at the centre of their policies***

realities, such as that we are now living in an era of mass and fast communications and open societies. Moreover, they pay little attention to shifting demographics and high rates of urbanisation. Meanwhile citizens, and especially the younger generations, reject nepotism and corrupt leadership. These issues are time bombs that must be adequately addressed.

One step towards overcoming these challenges would be increasing the transparency of national management of state resources.

The practical issue of how to increase security through a stronger focus on development must be addressed on an international level just as much as a national one, but conflicting priorities between states and the international community can present difficulties.

The present situation in the Sahel Sahara region is a telling example. In this region the main priority of national governments is to promote development while making use of external assistance to combat terrorist organisations. For developed countries with an interest in

the region, such as EU member states, the short- and mid-term priorities are more directly concerned with fighting terrorism and stopping migration flows and drug trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea.

While these priorities may not be conflicting in themselves, when it comes to aid allocation the two issues are in competition. In theory, the aim for both the development and security agendas should be leading successful strategies simultaneously on the two fronts, but in reality resource scarcity makes this difficult to achieve.

Today, just as during the Marshall Plan era more than seventy years ago, the many interconnections between development and security are recognised by all sides. But this does not necessarily translate to good governance in this area. The chief difficulty to be addressed is how governments can place the concerns of their citizens at the centre of their policies. And for this to be achieved, governments must sufficiently strengthen state institutions so as to stop the retribalisation of their countries and the deconstruction of their states. ●

# On its way to **stability and peace:** Nepal's **multi-level** peace process



*Since most conflicts cannot be resolved in the short term, enhancing conflict resolution skills was a crucial and lasting contribution to a sound ‘peace infrastructure’*

**Klaus Schreiner**, Head of the Peace and Emergency Aid Competence Centre at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

**Claudia Schraewer**, Advisor in the Peace and Emergency Aid Competence Centre at GIZ

International development organisations increasingly face the challenge of working in violent and fragile contexts to overcome the causes of conflict and to promote secure and peaceful development. Recent decades have seen a wide variety of policy and operational approaches – with varying degrees of success. Nepal’s development since 2000 is particularly interesting as an example of successful interactions between a range of actors across different policy areas.

In the 1990s structural inequality within the Nepalese feudal system and its inherent socio-economic marginalisation of lower castes, ethnic groups and women triggered violent conflict. The Maoist movement successfully recruited politicised young people and launched a guerrilla war against the monarchist government and its army. Support for the movement was particularly strong in neglected rural areas with high unemployment and poor development prospects. The emergence of a coalition





between the Maoist party and the urban middle-class Seven Party Alliance, combined with mostly peaceful mass protests, eventually pressed the government into signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in late 2006.

The CPA created the conditions for a safe and peaceful transition to greater democracy, social justice and stability. Nepal's international partners, including Germany, systematically supported the peace process at multiple levels. Their long-standing partnership pre-dating the civil war and their continuous presence in the country during the war created the trust necessary for successful cooperation throughout the difficult implementation of the CPA. While civil war was still raging, several international partners launched the 2003 Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG), a coordinated donor stance on operational cooperation in support of a future peace process. Promoting principles of impartiality, transparency, accountability and inclusion the so-called 'BOG-Group' of signatories became a reliable partner for successive Nepalese governments.

To enable operations in an environment marked by security and political risks, the German implementing organisation GIZ and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) created a neutral Risk Management Office (RMO), closely cooperating with the BOG signatories. During the civil war the RMO established itself as an analytical and security network for projects and staff. It supported implementing agencies and their Nepalese partners by assessing risks and unintended impacts. Its training courses and continuous

context analysis were important tools to put the 'do no harm' principle into practice.

The international (and particularly German, provided by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development - BMZ) support for the peace process followed a multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral approach with a view to stabilising the security situation and strengthening the state's delivery of services, providing a tangible peace dividend to the population. In doing so it focused on policy formulation and implementation alike.

At the national level, the Nepalese government received support for its Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF). In addition to international funding, an advisory team was seconded to the Peace Fund Secretariat by Germany. It supported the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in formulating strategy, negotiating with donors and strengthening its administrative capacity. Under the ministry's leadership the NPTF became a strategic mechanism for operational implementation of national policies at a local level. Key to the success of the overall peace process was the smooth disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former Maoist guerrilla forces, since a failure would have posed a critical security challenge. Efforts were made in those regions especially affected by the civil war, particularly in the districts hosting the cantonments of the Maoist ex-combatants.

The core work on reweaving the social fabric took place at the district and municipality level, focusing on (re)integrating former Maoist combatants into civil society. Many former



combatants are now acting as development ambassadors within their communities. The Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process (STPP) project, financed by Germany and Norway, was able to quickly step in because of continuous work by GIZ and other partners in conflict regions throughout the war. The success relied upon the trust built up with both parties during the civil war and the project's conflict-sensitive, inclusive approach. Hosting communities and cantonments were jointly involved in integrated project activities, fostering exchange and strengthening social cohesion. The measures included wide-ranging rebuilding of infrastructure and administrative buildings, fostering communal security, supporting disadvantaged groups, improving livelihood and stimulating local markets and businesses.

At the level of individuals and village communities the Civil Peace Service (CPS) programme, funded by the German government, supported these efforts by training mediators and dialogue facilitators. These persons closely worked with the STPP project to support (re)integration of former combatants. The wide range of methods used by civil society actors allowed for carefully addressing issues arising from conflict and for creating durable space for dialogue. Since most conflicts cannot be resolved in the short term, enhancing conflict-resolution skills among young people in particular was a crucial and lasting contribution to a sound 'peace infrastructure' and, therefore, to long-term reconciliation in Nepal.

The case of Nepal shows a multi-level approach where a national government and the international community jointly designed

***Key to the success of the overall peace process was the smooth disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former Maoist guerrilla forces***

and implemented to link policy formulation and implementation at national and local level. This approach simultaneously achieved improvements in the security situation, progress towards socio-economic recovery, and promotion of long-term reconciliation and peace. Contributing to this overall approach in a meaningful way required the implementing agencies, including GIZ, to follow various courses of action while continuously analysing the changing context in order. This allowed them to ensure conflict sensitivity and avoid unintended negative impacts, to quickly and flexibly developing programmes to counter imminent risks of relapse to violence and simultaneously working at the government and community level to deliver a peace dividend, winning over the population.

These successes are fragile and require long-term engagement, particularly by the international community, if they are to be permanent. Changing attitudes and behaviour, overcoming deeply rooted concepts of 'the enemy' and restoring trust are painstaking processes requiring committed individuals and institutions. ●



# Libya: it's **now** or **never**



***The international community's current funding methods are leading to fragmentation and competition for resources***

**Nira Abada**, Advisor at Strategic Swiss Partners

Despite international efforts in conflict-affected countries to build strong institutions and economies for achieving peace and security, we still see confusion in the international community's policies towards chaotic scenes on the ground.

For security and development, we need critical, urgent and coordinated efforts locally and internationally towards common vision and goals. It's a fundamental fact known to the international community, governments and on-the-ground agencies that there will be no security without development and vice

versa. Yet, when it comes to foreign policy and international agreements, the focus on security far eclipses considerations of development. This only serves to fuel a vicious cycle of increased poverty, corruption, and the expansion of armed groups such as ISIS.

The international community's current funding methods are leading to fragmentation and competition for resources. Most resources are spent responding to conflicts instead of on long-term projects to sustain peace, security and development. Moreover, it is pivotal that funding is allocated to local implementation

***Most resources are spent responding to conflicts instead of on long-term projects to sustain peace, security and development***

bodies, but the current strategy has resulted in funding being scattered around international implementers outside of the conflict-affected countries, only some of which have small local teams or partner with local NGOs. The question is why donors are not working directly with on-the-ground influencers to eliminate the wasting of resources?

Recently the European Union and its member states signed the 'New European Consensus on Development' blueprint which represents a plan of action to eliminate poverty and achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. One of the core areas to which European leaders have committed is building strong links between the different elements necessary for sustainable development, including development and security. The EU had previously highlighted the necessity of using innovative approaches with key players to achieve a security-development nexus, and this blueprint is another step forward.

In addition, the EU and its Member States are significant providers of Aid for Trade, which receives more than a third of the total EU Official

Development Assistance (ODA). They could leverage this position to support pilot projects for development in the areas with highest poverty.

Middle Eastern and North African countries affected by conflicts face complex challenges that require a high level of understanding and collaboration to resolve. These challenges should be addressed rapidly, before poverty hits its peak leading to a surge in the power of armed groups. When poverty is accompanied by fragile institutions, liquidity crisis and corruption, there will be further destabilisation with a global impact as these countries become larger hubs for extremists and terrorists.

Under-development and high poverty levels are also due to a crumbling private sector, with international companies and investments receiving the red flag from their governments and international communities if they display any interest in entering conflict affected countries. Poverty has led some citizens to join armed groups which pay higher rates and even provide phones and cars to encourage youths to join them. The equation is simple: sustainable



development will eradicate poverty, eliminate armed groups and strengthen institutions, resulting in peace, a stronger state and economy with a better aligned vision between the international community and the countries affected by conflicts.

Other questions remain: which conflict-affected countries will have the courage to start addressing security challenges through development, and who from the international community will provide support to ensure the theory turns into reality?

A good example of a country struggling to find the balance between security and development is Libya. Libya is rich with resources and home grown talent: its oil output recently hit above one million barrels a day, thanks to mastermind Mustafa Sana Allah, the CEO of Libya's National Oil Corporation. Despite its natural and human capital, Libya is still struggling to build strong institutions, implement a constitution, provide security and develop its economy.

For the past few years, the international community's focus in Libya was on conflict response, and, more recently, on immigration; meanwhile they have ignored significant problems such as high levels of poverty, corruption, low standards of education, liquidity crisis and the list goes on.

Meanwhile, the international community's achievements so far are not necessarily felt in the daily life of Libya's citizens. This highlights the disparity between the country's needs and what the international community thinks

it needs. Government entities and local civil society groups rely on international support and will tailor their programmes to secure it, even if this means programmes do not address the most pressing issues. Many questions will stay unanswered unless there is a sub-national tailored strategy from the international community, which focuses on collaboration between national and international bodies towards sustainable goals.

In some regards, Libya's security situation is looking more positive. The defeat of ISIS by the Libyan National Army and the freeing of Benghazi were considered milestones in the road towards a stable and secure Libya. This tremendous win was followed by the opening of the Libyan Benina Airport, where Libyan Airlines operates domestic and international flights: another indication that Benghazi is ready for a complete turnaround into a phase of economic development. Will Benghazi be the perfect model to implement the security-development nexus? We have to wait and see the next moves from both the Libyan government and the international community.

In spite of these recent successes in Benghazi, the south of the country continues to struggle as rival forces, tribes and armed groups compete for power; international aid is shifting to the south to implement projects focussing on security and immigration, while development efforts are forgotten. In Libya, as elsewhere, the international community must remember that without development we will not achieve long lasting security. ●

## Reflecting on the security and development nexus in Africa



***The growing concept of ‘human security’ underlines the importance of empowering individuals and groups to benefit from economic growth and development***

**Sibry Tapsoba**, Director of the Fragile States Department at the African Development Bank

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Extreme poverty, political and economic marginalisation, poor governance and lack of access to opportunities are not only challenges that millions of Africans face, but a fertile breeding ground for threats such as civil conflicts, extreme terrorism and uncontrolled migration.

Since the publication of the United Nations ‘A More Secure World’ report, threats to one are increasingly threats to all. The growth of fundamentalism in one region affects other regions in the form of export of terrorism, massive internal displacements and overflow

of refugees. Similarly, poverty and poor health infrastructure in one region can lead to pandemics that easily reach other regions.

Security can no longer be effectively addressed from the traditional state-centric perspective, where national security and law enforcement apparatus are all that is needed to ensure the security of citizens. Instead, security has become global, with a focus on individuals and groups’ access to the benefits of development –a more people-centred security. The growing concept of ‘human security’ therefore underlines



the importance of empowering individuals and groups to benefit from economic growth and development, so as to not only protect them from conflicts and tensions but also to build their resilience to engage in development activities. There can be no peace without development and, equally, no sustained development can take place without peace.

Security and political stability therefore have to be anchored in the availability of institutional capacities, opportunities and decent standards of living. Indeed, countries with high inequality

and weak institutions often have high levels of social violence. Research shows that poor distribution of wealth, insufficient economic opportunities, jobs and limited freedom, particularly for a large young population, significantly increase the risk of instability; such societies tend to be far more affected by transnational and organised crime. Indeed, the purveyors of human traffic and other types of international organised crime find the most fertile ground in societies and communities that lack basic services and economic opportunities.

***We must recognise that violent conflict is a manifestation of fragility whose drivers need to be clearly identified***

Particularly informative is the observation that whether or not conflict is correlated to growth depends on the type of growth or its unevenness across sectors or groups. For Africa, this is particularly telling – the human development index in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by more than nine per cent during the 1990-2014 period. Progress was also made in other areas, with almost 68% of Africans having access to safe water today, up from 55% in 2000. The under-five mortality rate decreased from 162 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 83 per 1,000 live births in 2014. Life expectancy is now estimated at 60 years, compared to 47 years in 2000. Over the same period, Africa experienced its best economic and per capita income growth.

But with the global financial and economic crisis, and the subsequent collapse in commodity prices and poor management of resources, growth stalled in many economies on the continent. Africa has seen rising armed conflicts and unprecedented humanitarian situations, including a spike in forced human displacements (in country, inter-country and international). These events are taking place amid rising extremism and security challenges that are constraining opportunities for millions of

people. The OECD reports that African migrants in Europe increased by about 1.4m people between 2010 and 2013, with the median age being 29.9 years. Most of these refugees are from the Horn of Africa and West Africa, and their movement is driven by conflict and poverty. The above observations confirm the need to pay more attention to the security-development nexus.

While acknowledging the limitations of the divide between humanitarian and development approaches in responding to the security and development challenges facing Africa, there is a need for caution. Specifically, we must recognise that violent conflict is a manifestation of fragility whose drivers need to be clearly identified. The African Development Bank High-Level Report on Conflicts and Fragility (chaired by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia) and its Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa consider fragility as a risk whereby the pressures are too strong for countries, institutions or communities to adequately respond. The report also notes that countries' available capacities and resources for the required responses vary: hence the need to focus on key entry points for managing the underlying drivers in each situation. In this context, the AfDB focuses on building resilience and targeting communities without abandoning its larger national development mandate.

Building resilient communities and supporting the national development objectives mitigates the losses inflicted on countries due to insecurity. Particularly disturbing is the observation that conflict is always associated





with underdevelopment or regression. Whereas there is a dearth of statistics on the costs of insecurity, civil wars were estimated to cost an average US\$64bn annually. Similarly, armed conflict is estimated to have cost Africa \$284bn from 1990–2005. More recently, Africa has been hit by waves of violence in places such as South Sudan, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, north-eastern Nigeria and the regions of neighbouring countries, and Burkina Faso. This is in addition to the long-standing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, Somalia and Central African Republic.

There are no greater impacts of insecurity than those felt in the tourism sectors of Tunisia, Egypt and Mali. Following the attacks in Sousse and Tunis in 2015, tourism revenues are estimated to have plummeted from \$3.5bn to a mere \$1.5bn in 2016. While the sector is slowly recovering, its impact on the tourist mix has seen daily tourist spend falling from about €60 to €30, leaving the industry's revenue still depressed. In Egypt, insecurity threats and fears have led to a decline in tourist arrivals from more than 14 million in 2010 to less than ten million in 2016. Mali has similarly been impacted following the Timbuktu and Bamako

attacks. Tourist arrival dropped by 50% in 2015 compared to the previous year while revenues plummeted from more than €76m to less than €5m. Given the labour intensive nature of the sector, thousands of employees have lost their jobs, while governments have boosted security measures in a bid to reassure tourists.

The security of countries, no matter how advanced, is intricately linked to development not just within their borders, but also in other countries and regions of the world. Responses to security threats cannot be limited to military action, but should incorporate development solutions to entrench the 'peace dividend' in communities, create societies that are more inclusive, and create conditions for sustained economic growth. Understanding fragility and implementing initiatives such as the '10,000 Communities in 1,000 Days' are therefore crucial. ●

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## PART 4

# RECOMMENDATIONS



These recommendations draw on the viewpoints and ideas presented by the authors of the articles in this discussion paper and the debate “To achieve Agenda 2030, give peace a chance” that took place as part of the European Development Days in June 2017.

## **ADOPT A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

The changing nature of crises in past decades, with armed confrontations taking on new forms, urgently calls for the various stakeholders intervening in fragile societies to adopt a new strategy. The success of post-conflict reconstruction lies in the capacity to design and implement comprehensive policies that effectively combine efforts to ensure safe and secure environments for citizens with measures to generate decent and productive living conditions. Only a comprehensive approach will enable us to go beyond simply treating the symptoms of a crisis towards tackling its root causes.

## **PLACE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT ON AN EQUAL FOOTING**

Peace and security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century demand that we pay as much attention to ‘soft’, non-traditional security challenges, including development, governance and environmental degradation, as to ‘hard’ security ones. The increase of armed

conflict in developing countries does not imply that development aid now needs to be spent on security measures. Current proposals to divert funds from existing civilian conflict prevention and development instruments towards military capacity-building programmes should therefore be met with caution. Better linkages between long-term development programmes to short- and medium-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention measures is more likely to be effective.

## **LEARN FROM PAST MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES**

The international community must draw honest lessons from past experiences, especially the failure of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also successes in countries such as Colombia. The first lesson is that development should not be used as a stabilisation instrument within a strictly security-oriented framework. The second is that each specialist should focus on what they are trained to do, whilst working in a coordinated manner. Soldiers should not be delivering aid, just as aid workers should not be responsible for security. Each should focus on their strengths and leverage their competitive advantage to deliver ‘peace dividends’.



## **WORK TOWARDS BETTER COORDINATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION**

Rather than subsuming development under security and vice-versa, it is the combination and consistency of security and development measures that can reverse cycles of violence. To secure lasting peace, better links are needed between governments, security actors, development agencies and civil society. Working to build the necessary relationships to cooperate effectively from the onset of a crisis also means that the same set of relationships and level of understanding required to work collectively exist to prevent crises from happening in the first place.

## **FIGHT INEQUALITIES AND BUILD TRUST**

In many areas around the world, what lies at the heart of conflict is a lack of integration, when people feel they have been left behind and unjustly treated. Securing peace therefore requires working on building trust and delivering the ‘peace dividends’ of respect and opportunities that marginalised communities have long sought. It is particularly important to focus on the youth: enhancing conflict-resolution skills among young people is crucial to create a sound ‘peace infrastructure’ and foster long-term reconciliation in and between divided communities.

## **INVOLVE LOCAL ACTORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

There are sometimes disparities between a country’s needs and what the international community thinks it needs. Local civil society and government entities rely on international funding and will often tailor their programmes to secure it, even if they do not address the most pressing issues. It is therefore important to integrate local actors in the elaboration of projects to ensure maximum efficiency and local ownership. In addition, reintegrating former combatants into civil society is a key issue to be addressed for lasting peace, as shown by the successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former guerrilla forces in Nepal.

## **IMPROVE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIC FORESIGHT**

Understanding the root causes of conflict is vital to make sure we can act on conflicts before they even appear. To that end, the European Commission is adopting a more integrated approach to conflict management, focusing on risk assessment and ‘dynamic monitoring’ to keep conflicts from escalating. For that, it is crucial to bring together various stakeholders for joint analysis, as different points of observation make it possible to highlight dimensions that are invisible to other actors. New technologies can also play a key role in improving strategic foresight.

## **BUILD SECURITY INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO CITIZENS**

Focusing primarily on a government's security does not necessarily ensure security for individuals. To ensure a lasting peace, promoting stability through security sector reform is essential, but this needs to put citizens at its heart, as people will only regain trust in local police and armed forces if they are effective, transparent, free of corruption and accountable to both citizens and parliaments. An important aspect is the reform of public financial management in security, as a way to strengthen civilian oversight, accountability and transparency.

***The changing nature of crises urgently calls for the adoption of a new strategy in fragile and conflict-affected states***

## **DRAW THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER**

International companies and investments often get the red flag from their governments and the international community if they show any interest in entering conflict-affected countries. It is however vital to recognise the central role companies can play in securing peace and stability through the creation of jobs and employment. To foster economic growth, risk-averse companies need stronger incentives to invest in countries transitioning out of conflict. At the same time, we need to be careful that the way the private sector operates does not increase divisions in society.

## **STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING**

The inclusion of women is key to sustainable and peaceful development; even though they are often the worst affected by conflict, they are frequently excluded from peace talks and peacebuilding measures. Women are also among the first responders in a crisis, helping families and communities to survive and eventually to rebuild. Enabling women to play a key role in peace processes adds new perspectives and promotes women's role as actors of change. A particular emphasis should be put on civil society actors such as women's groups as only these are able to produce long-term social change.



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